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Abstract 
Since Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the start of the conflict in the Donbass 
region, the EU has introduced three waves of restrictive measures against Russia, which are 
regularly updated. Having thus expanded from measures targeting individuals to entire sectors, 
the current EU sanctions policy impacts Russia’s financial markets, energy sector and defence 
industry. On top of this, new bans affect EU investments, services and trade in Crimea and 
Sevastopol. 
While they hurt the Russian economy, the EU sanctions also have a boomerang effect, especially 
in conjunction with the countersanctions imposed by the Kremlin on EU food imports. In this lose-
lose situation, the usefulness of the EU sanctions has been called into doubt, in particular in those 
EU member states that are the most economically intertwined with Russia. 
How successful has the EU been so far in pushing its case with the Kremlin and what moves are 
left for the two main actors in the sanctioner-sanctionee ‘Game of Thrones’? This Working 
Document offers a SWOT analysis of the EU sanctions policy towards Russia and identifies the 
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EU Sanctions Policy towards Russia: 
The Sanctioner-Sanctionee’s  
Game of Thrones 
Tatia Dolidze* 
CEPS Working Document No. 402 / January 2015 
Introduction 
There is a certain political wisdom to George R.R. Martin’s Game of Thrones that offers pertinent 
insights into present EU-Russian relations as well. As the EU keeps applying and reinforcing 
its sanctions against Russia, “winds of winter” for the House Stark might be coming as a reminder 
that “a Lannister always pays his debts”.  
Thus with the “winds of winter” approaching, it would be sensible to reflect on the strengths 
to cultivate, weaknesses to minimise, opportunities to seize and threats to counteract – in short, 
to perform a SWOT analysis – in the overall EU’s sanctions agenda towards Russia, if the EU, 
as the House Stark, is to get through the winter afflicting its ‘lands’.  
1. The sanctioner’s [EU] actions 
Following Russia’s absorption of the Crimean peninsula, the EU has introduced restrictive 
measures against Russia in three successive stages which have been periodically revised. The 
most recent regulation (revision), adopted on 18 December 2014 (Council of the EU, 2014a), 
updated the decision of 23 June 2014 (Council of the EU, 2014b) by mainly prohibiting EU 
investment, services and trade flows to Crimea and Sevastopol (this latest addition to the 
existing EU sanctions list1 can also be seen in the context of the EU non-recognition policy 
towards the annexed territories rather than that of the EU sanctions policy against Russia as 
such). Having expanded from the individual to the sectoral level, as diagrammed in Figure 1, 
the current sanctions policy towards Russia is aimed the following targets: 
i) private entities and individuals via visa bans and freezes on assets; 
ii) financial markets by banning long-term EU loans for the five main state-owned banks 
(Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank (VEB) and Rosselkhozbank); 
iii) the energy sector through restrictions on Rosneft, Transneft and Gazprom Neft activities; 
and 
iv) the defence industry by means of blacklisting Russian ‘dual-use’ (civil and military) 
technology manufacturers, such as the ‘Saiga’ producing Kalashnikov rifles. 2 
                                                   
* Tatia Dolidze is Research Assistant at CEPS. 
1 For the timeline of EU’s sanction policy updates, see the ‘blacklists’ released 17 March 2014; 21 March 
2014; 28 April 2014; 12 May 2014; 25 July 2014; 30 July 2014; 12 September 2014, 28 November 2014; 18 
December 2014 
2 For an alternative classification, see Michael Emerson’s commentary, “The EU-Ukraine-Russia 
Sanctions Triangle”, CEPS, 13 October 2014 (www.ceps.eu/book/eu-ukraine-russia-sanctions-
triangle).  
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Figure 1. Targets of current sanctions towards Russia 
 
Source: BBC. 
This batch of sanctions in support of the Ukrainian cause is the farthest the EU has gone so far 
in holding Russia accountable for the deliberate destabilising actions in the neighbouring 
sovereign countries.  
A similar scenario had developed six years ago in Georgia, when Russian troops entered the 
Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but that did not lead the EU to 
impose sanctions. What is more, the Tagliavini Report commissioned by the Council of the EU 
(2008), partially even freed Russia from the responsibility for the aggression by assigning first-
strike liability to Georgia. By the same token, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the states 
of Russia’s ‘near abroad’ have witnessed their constituencies breaking away with the Russian 
direct or indirect involvement. The frozen/protracted conflicts of Transnistria in Moldova, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and to a certain extent also Nagorno-Karabakh 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia can also be attributed to the Kremlin. In these relatively 
similar cases, the EU has not been as straightforward as it is in Crimea right now, or as Nicu 
Popescu suggested – the EU was even “reluctant” to act (Popescu, 2009).  
2. The sanctionee’s [Russia] counter-actions 
On 6 August 2014, in response to the restrictive measures undertaken by the EU (and the US 
and its allies), the Russian Federation imposed a one-year embargo on the imports of meat, 
fish, cheese, fruit, vegetables and dairy products not only from the EU and the US, but also 
from Australia, Canada and Norway (European Commission, 2014a). Prior to the embargo, 
the EU’s agricultural food exports to Russia stood at €11,864 million, accounting for 10% of 
total EU agri-food world exports (European Commission, 2014b). 
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Figure 2. Russia’s food imports 
  
Source: CNN. 
It seems that the EU has already inflicted the maximum damage it can by applying the 
overarching sanctions policy – the hard-power tool or at least the hardest tool of the soft power 
at the EU’s disposal. Conversely, the Kremlin’s retaliatory options are not limited to the ban 
on EU agricultural imports [see “Threats”]. 
3. SWOT analysis of the EU sanctions policy towards Russia 
3.1 Strengths 
The main strength of the EU’s latest set of sanctions against Russia is its wide-ranging sectoral 
nature as compared to the individually-targeted ones of before, which were still restricting but 
were also restricted. Even more, the current sanctions are still only at the baseline of level 3 
and thus could still be strengthened (as currently being negotiated following the EU foreign 
Affairs Council meeting of January 29, 2015). For countries like Moldova, Georgia and 
Ukraine, which seek the EU’s support against the ‘big brother’, the tougher the EU measures 
are against Russia, the more convincing is the support. Thus, after EU’s extended expressions 
of disapproval of the Kremlin’s actions, the new high-profile sanctions policy carries a more 
credible political value.  
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Figure 3. Ukraine by numbers 
  
Source: CNN.  
Also economically speaking, individual sanctions could not have brought about similar 
sectoral fallouts that the present western sanctions policy has brought to the Russian economy. 
The financial sector has already been hit hard by sanctions: Russia is experiencing capital 
flight, stock prices have gone down, investors have fled the country and the ruble has also 
depreciated (note also the link with the sharp decline in global oil prices!).  
Table 1. Key macroeconomic indicators of the Russian economy 
  
Source: bne IntelliNews. 
As suggested by the figures in Table 1, a sharp drop in oil prices with sanctions still in place 
will lead to recession in 2015. What is more, the ramifications of the trade sanctions are still to 
come. With the impact of the sanctions expected to become more and more apparent during 
the next two years, the latest World Bank report on the Russian economy predicted stagnation 
in its baseline scenario (World Bank, 2014). Even more, the economic situation in Russia is 
getting closer to the World Bank’s pessimistic scenario as Russia seems to be entering the 
recession phase.  
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The former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin argues the “the sanctions that have been imposed 
are going to have an impact over one, or two years, because they have cut investment 
opportunities”, foreseeing a 3 to 4% fall if the sanctions are not lifted and the political tensions 
are not relieved. That is because the imposition of sanctions and geopolitical tensions have 
resulted in the loss of consumer and investor confidence in an environment of the political 
uncertainty. In brief, “the economy is close to recession”, as acknowledged by Oleg Zasov, the 
Director of the Macroeconomic Forecasting at the Russian Ministry of the Economic 
Development (The Independent, 2014). On the other hand, the sanctions are hurting EU 
business as well, leading several member states to question their usefulness, while still 
supporting them (Reuters, 2014a).  
Figure 4. Russia’s growth outlook 
  
Source: World Bank. 
If sanctions policy is nothing but the economic might to exert political pressure, having the 
world’s biggest economy in play is definitely an external ‘strong point’ for the EU to push its 
political cause with Russia. As common sense would suggest, the sanctioner is expected to be 
economically stronger than the sanctionee as it is the former that is supposed to pressure the 
latter into changing its political behaviour. However, the EU has to ensure it is not politically 
teased: US Vice President Joe Biden has already claimed that it was the United States that 
“embarrassed” the EU into sanctions (Biden, 2014). Although this statement took the EU’s 
High Representative Federica Mogherini by surprise (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014), it is 
accurate to say that the US was the driving force and then a strong link in the chain of Western 
sanctions against Russia.  
As for the next moves available to the EU, there are two worldwide platforms with both EU 
and Russian participation that the former could use to pressure the latter into altering its 
foreign policy behaviour: the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Society of Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT). Both WTO and SWIFT could indeed 
present the EU with ‘attacking/threatening pieces’ in its chess-game with Russia, yet 
activation of these two bodies might also turn to be very problematic (Economist, 2014) for the 
EU. The EU has already filed a complaint (DS485) against Russia for violating the tariff 
commitments the latter had made under the WTO framework (World Trade Organization, 
2014a). For the EU, it is its 4th formal complaint against Russia while Russia had also used the 
WTO platform twice before. The disputes launched by Russia so far have been directed at the 
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EU’s alleged ‘Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Imports from Russia’ (World Trade Organization, 2014b) and ‘Certain Measures Relating to 
the Energy Sector’ (World Trade Organization, 2014c). In brief, this multilateral avenue has 
already been used or even abused several times by both of the sides and thus using the ‘WTO 
strength’ may well prove to be difficult for the EU. As the two-months of official negotiations 
under the WTO framework are unlikely to be constructive, it will be up to the panel of judges 
to rule on the dispute.  
Regarding the SWIFT ‘piece’, cutting Russia out of SWIFT would mean cutting it off from 
global financial transactions, in other words, simply crashing the Russian economy. Russia’s 
former finance minister Alexei Kudrin remarked: “If the SWIFT system is cut off after all, this 
factor alone may cause a GDP contraction by up to 5% during the year since the restriction is 
imposed” (TASS, 2014a). CNN’s Global Public Square staff has rightfully called SWIFT “the 
nuclear weapon of the sanctions arsenal” (Global Public Square, 2014). This option has already 
been discussed among the EU leaders and the proposal has even been made by the European 
Parliament to “consider excluding Russia from the SWIFT system” (European Parliament, 
2014). In response, SWIFT published a statement on its website asserting that “SWIFT will not 
make unilateral decisions to disconnect institutions from its network as a result of political 
pressure” (SWIFT, 2014). However, as this ‘neutral global cooperative company’ is based in 
Brussels and is set up under Belgian law, it might well need to comply with such ‘pressure’ if 
the EU decides to ‘command’ it to do so. Yet, using the swift chess piece can trigger a reciprocal 
damage. As Russia’s former chairman of the Central Bank, Sergei Dubinin explained: No 
SWIFT means no money, and no money means no gas” (US-Russia.org, 2014). Russia would 
have to stop gas deliveries to Europe or the EU would have to pay to Russia in rubles instead 
of dollars, which – referring back to the previous argument – the US would never allow as it 
would mean the demise of the petro-dollar. 
Be that as it may, the most important aspect of the sanctions foreign policy tool is that it is 
meant to change foreign policy behaviour rather than to punish. That is to say, the 
ramifications for the Russian economy cannot be considered as the strength of the sanctions 
policy if it does not lead to its original political goal. For the political goals of the economic 
sanctions to be achieved, they ought to be complemented with democracy support 
instruments: facilitating the movement of the ordinary Russian people while still restraining 
the individuals targeted by the sanctions; funding undergraduate exchange programmes for 
Russian youth to study in the EU and experience the European way of life; holding 
information campaigns that counter the Russian information filter; and supporting 
independent research. These instruments might not yield immediate results, but they surely 
represent the long-term investments that will pay off once Russian civil society is developed 
into a strong and well-informed authority.  
Revising Russia’s eligibility for the EU’s external financing instruments aimed at the EU’s 
strategic partners was definitely a step forward in that direction.3 Under the new European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) framework, Russia now remains eligible for Cross-Border 
Cooperation (CBC) and multi-country programmes including Erasmus+ (Council of the EU, 
                                                   
3 For the background note on the EU’s external financing instruments, see “External Financing 
Instruments”, European Parliament News, 12 September 2013 (www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/ 
news-room/content/20131209BKG30301/html/External-financing-instruments). 
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2014c). Additionally, the bilateral relations are covered by the new Partnership Instrument (PI) 
which is also directed at promoting academic cooperation (Council of the EU, 2014d).4  
3.2 Weaknesses 
One of the main weaknesses of the EU’s sanctions’ is the lack of unity within the EU over their 
usefulness. Explicitly, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban believes the EU is “shooting 
itself in the foot” with the sanctions it imposed on Russia (Reuters, 2014b) and accordingly, 
Hungary does not plan on ‘going along’. Quite the reverse, Hungary is strengthening its 
economic ties with Russia: the two have recently signed a deal to build additional reactor 
blocks [currently, four Russian reactors are running] at the Paks nuclear plant, plus a €10 
billion loan for further construction (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2014). Hungary had 
also made a commitment to the South Stream pipeline project (Euractiv, 2014a) until Russia 
decided to abandon it (IMR, 2014). Similarly, Slovakian President Robert Fico proclaimed the 
EU sanctions to be “meaningless and counterproductive” (Reuters, 2014c). Along these lines, 
Slovakia has boosted economic cooperation with Russia by signing a 15-year Russian oil-
supply deal (Sputnik, 2014). The deal was first announced in October 2014 when the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia Miroslav Lajčák paid Moscow a post-Crimea-annexation visit – 
a significant diplomatic gesture (Guardian, 2014). The Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka 
used the metaphor ‘Iron Curtain’ to express his disagreement with the Russia-EU sanctions 
war (Reuters, 2014d). Even Poland, historically known for its uncompromising attitude 
towards Russia, took a softer line. With the change of the prime minister came also the foreign 
policy change towards the Ukrainian crisis. Poland is switching now to “a pragmatic policy” 
as stated by the new Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz (Wall Street Journal, 2014a). 
Equally, Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb stressed that “Finland in general isn’t of the 
opinion that now is the right time” (Wall Street Journal, 2014b). Given Finland’s strong 
economic ties with Russia “the right time” for the sanctions might even never come (100% of 
gas and 71% of its oil imports come from Russia (Guardian, 2014); Russia has 9.6% share of 
total Finnish exports (Finnish Ministry of Finance, 2014); Finland profited from cross-border 
movements and trade (tourism) with neighbouring Russia, which has now been reduced 
(Independent, 2014)). As the EU member states that depend on Russia in different economic 
fields, these countries are trying to take the middle-way position between Brussels and 
Kremlin, ergo to ‘play with two cards’ as Finnish PM Alexander Stubb himself put it. Hence, 
EU member states fail to coordinate their actions towards Russia as their vulnerability levels 
vary: those economically more engaged with Russia are not willing to sacrifice their socio-
economic well-being for an uncertain ‘better cause’, thus weakening the EU’s stance.  
Correspondingly, the lack of solidarity from the candidate countries that practice a more 
obvious ‘Russia-lobbying’ should come as no surprise. Specifically, Serbian PM Aleksandar 
Vučić does not feel any responsibility for the dispute in Ukraine to which its country has not 
contributed in any way, nor for the measures [sanctions] undertaken by the EU without having 
consulted Serbia (Euractiv, 2014b). That is to say Serbia is not going to line up behind the EU 
sanctions against Russia; nor is it planning to go against its own economic interests (food trade 
with Russia) in solidarity with the counter-sanctioned EU (EUobserver, 2014). Even more, the 
Minister of Agriculture of Serbia Snezana Bogosavljevic-Boskovic views the Russian ban on 
European products as “a unique chance Serbia should use if it is able to meet Russia’s high 
                                                   
4 For more information on scope, objectives and timeframe of the new Partnership Instrument, see 
“Partnership Instrument – First Multi-annual Indicative Programme for the period 2014-2017”, 
European Commission, 3 July 2014 (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/pi_mip_annex_en.pdf).  
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standards and regulations” (Russia Today, 2014b). The same is true for another EU candidate 
country, Turkey, which also seems to see an ongoing EU-Russia sanctions war as a window of 
opportunity. “Amid a deadlock among Russia, Ukraine, EU and USA [...] we will approach 
even more Russia”, the Turkish Finance Minister Nihat Zeybekci stated (Euractiv, 2014c).  
However the EU sanctions policy ‘chain’ is not only made of ‘weak links’ and even several 
third countries contribute to its strengthening. As stated in two of the 15 October 2014 Council 
press releases, FYROM, Iceland, Albania (EU candidate countries), Liechtenstein, Norway 
(EFTA countries) and EEA members along with Ukraine and Georgia aligned themselves with 
the EU sanctions policy (Decisions 2014/658/CFS (Council of the EU, 2014e) and 
2014/659/CFSP (Council of the EU, 2014f)). Switzerland also signed on with the EU’s latest 
sanctions package against Russia by updating its previous ordonnance on the matter (Swiss 
Federal Administration, 2014). Yet, in its sanctions war with Russia, it is important for the EU 
not only to secure alignment with its own sanctions, but also to ensure that the third countries 
share the EU’s burden of the Russian counter-sanctions as well. Viz. “the European Union 
expects third and candidate countries to refrain from measures which are aimed at exploiting 
new trading opportunities from the introduction of these measures [Russian ban on European 
agricultural products]” (as communicated in the 3332nd Foreign Affairs Council meeting press 
release, para 11 on Ukraine). That is because third-countries covertly or openly replacing 
European food on the Russian market turn the ‘lose-lose’ sanctions war into a ‘win-lose’ one 
(relatively speaking) in Russia’s favour. An alternative interpretation is that the warning might 
simply be an ‘invitation’ to express solidarity with the European Union. There have already 
been some cases of third countries opportunistically stepping in. In Latin America, e.g. 
Ecuador, Brazil, Chile and Argentina have begun exporting more meat and dairy products to 
Russia; Pakistan is substituting Australian lamb on the Russian market; Iran mostly with its 
fruits and vegetables. Other potential exporters include Sri Lanka; Uruguay…  
Figure 5. Where Russia gets its imports (%)  
   
Source: Nikkei Asian Review. 
Even some EU companies have been secretly supplying Russia with the banned European 
products, benefiting not only Russian consumers, but also the transit country and the EU 
‘smugglers’. Notwithstanding the profit at the societal level (European products available 
[relatively speaking] on the Russian market = less societal concern over the Russian ban = 
more support of the Kremlin policies), the Kremlin still seems determined to demonstrate it 
actually means what it does or says. Russia’s veterinary and phytosanitary surveillance service 
Rosselkhoznadzor has reported the doubling of Belarus seafood imports from Norway 
(Undercurrent News, 2014) along with the substantial increase of dairy imports from 
Lithuania and Poland (TASS, 2014b) or Dutch, German and Polish meat “made in Brazil” 
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(Interfax-Ukraine, 2014). Consequently, Russia has faulted Belarus (TASS, 2014c) for the ‘grey’ 
trade and the two now have on-going misunderstandings over the ‘transit’ of European 
products via Russia. (There have been some claims that Belarus (in response) has reinstated 
customs control at the Russian border (TASS, 2014d), which the former later denied (BELTA, 
2014)). The most illustrious Belarussian ‘grey’ trade example, widely commented on in social 
media (LiveLeak, 2014), involved “made in Belarus” seafood being sold in Russia (nota bene: 
Belarus has no access to the sea) allegedly through Norway (one of the EU sanctions-aligned 
states). Other countries accused of ‘smuggling’ by Russia include Kazakhstan, Montenegro 
and Bosnia (see ItarTass). Thus, the main weaknesses in the current EU sanctions policy 
discussed above can be summed up as a lack of unity within and a lack of solidary from the 
outside.  
Moreover, as the Kremlin turned the agricultural sector into a strategic one – i.e. by sacrificing 
the socio-economic well-being of its citizens for geopolitical ambitions – one would expect that 
to have turned public opinion against Putin. Yet, it seems that the ‘unfair’ western sanctions 
have had the perverse effect of increasing Putin’s popularity – from the beginning of the 
Ukraine crisis in November 2013 to the present, his ratings have risen from an ever-low to an 
ever-high point.  
Figure 6. Economic and political indicators from Russia (change versus March 2013) 
  
Source: Quartz. 
The current state of affairs suggests that even with the rising food prices because of Kremlin’s 
retaliatory ban on Western imports, Russian society is prepared to accept sacrifices. According 
to polls conducted by the Yuri Levada Analytical Center based in Moscow in August 2014, 
72% of Russians approve the Kremlin’s retaliatory sanctions (Sputnik, 2014b). In this context, 
it seems that sanctioning, as a foreign policy tool against Russia, is weak in that it might cause 
what it is trying to prevent: Russian jingoism.  
This time, however, the Russian ’empire state of mind’ might not last. Living standards of the 
Russian population are going down (JRL, 2015), as revenues drop due to the 25% decline in 
the price of oil. This may further lead to the exhaustion of the Russian state’s Welfare Fund to 
cushion the fall of the ruble and eventually, to the electorate’s resentment of Putin’s politics. 
Therefore, Putin can be seen as torn between delivering two of his main 2012 electoral 
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promises: increased social spending and Russia’s increased political power. Subsequently, 
Russian economic expert Sergei Guriev expects Putin to intensify both his propaganda 
campaign and domestic repression (Financial Times, 2014a). As for Putin’s external actions, 
Carl Bildt argues: “Revisionism might turn into outright revanchism as the Kremlin seeks to 
counter-balance internal weakness with demonstrations of external strength.” Thus, it will 
require some effort on Putin’s part before the Russian people further prioritise geopolitical 
drives over living standards.  
Yet, short-lived or not, Russian nationalist sentiment is still strong, as shown in Tables A1 and 
A2 of the Annex. Thus, the EU has to further encourage Russian citizens’ to change their 
attitude towards Putin’s politics rather than simply counting on the Russian ‘siege mentality’ 
(The Jamestown Foundation, 2014) to disappear overnight. It is even less likely to happen as 
the fact of Russia being punished for the Ukrainian cause is negatively affecting the image of 
the EU in the eyes of ordinary Russians (RBTH, 2014). When asked about the reasons behind 
the intense western reaction to the Crimean crisis, 58% of the Levada respondents see it as an 
example of the west’s hostile attitude towards Russia and the desire to seize the moment to 
put pressure on the Kremlin (see Table A1 in the Annex). In view of that, 71% of Russians 
believe that the objective of western sanctions is to weaken and humiliate Russia (see Table A2 
in the Annex). It further has to be noted that the percentage of the Russian population 
considering Western sanctions as aimed primarily at the officials responsible for Russia's 
policy towards Ukraine has decreased (42% in May 2014 to 30% in September 2014). According 
to the Levada Center, more and more Russians began to perceive sanctions as measures 
directed against themselves (see Table A3), i.e. the population (27% in May 2014 vs 41% in 
September 2014). For Russian citizens there seems to be no difference between sanctions 
against the Russian leadership, Russian business companies or the population per se (see Table 
3 in the Annex). Thus, the EU must make sure that Russian society discerns this difference 
before the ill-disposed attitude towards EU can be expected to change. It could best be done 
through some kind of a “public outreach campaign” advocated by Clara Portela in her study 
of the EU’s use of targeted sanctions (Portela, 2014). 
3.3 Opportunities 
The fact of the EU and US jointly flexing their economic muscles against Russia was evaluated 
above as a ‘strength’ of the EU sanctions policy. The argument still holds, but the US is not 
economically as intertwined with Russia as the EU is (the US accounts for a 4% share against 
the EU’s 40% share of Russia’s imports]. Thus, the vulnerability levels of the two are different, 
requiring different strategies to even them out. That is why Europe needs to develop a fully-
fledged strategy of its own as it cannot allow itself to simply follow suit. The ‘US-designed’ 
EU policy towards Russia is rendering Europe excessively vulnerable to a Russian whiplash 
effect. Therefore, the EU should make sure that while coordinating its sanctions policy with 
that of the United States, it is still ‘allowed’ to act alone and develops its ‘own way’ with Russia. 
Also because there is a possibility that the EU might not only be ‘let’ but also ‘left’ alone as the 
US becomes more and more entrenched in the fight against the Islamic State and thus less and 
less engaged in Ukraine. Director of ECFR, Mark Leonard, offers a comparable example from 
a very recent political history: “We had sanctions after Georgia was attacked by Russia and 
they were removed because the Obama administration wanted to reset its policy towards 
Russia without Russia having met any of the criteria that needed to be met in order to lift them. 
And I think it's not that difficult to imagine something like this happening again if a future 
American administration is dealing with IS or Iran where it needs Russia to help it.” (DW, 
2014) Hence, the US engagement can also be seen as an ‘opportunity’ – an additional impetus 
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for the EU to develop an independent EU Common Defence and Security policy. As an 
alternative, another opportune scenario might also develop: The EU and NATO may well 
intensify Euro-Atlantic cooperation. In this case, the Ukraine crisis could serve as a ‘three-eyed 
raven’, thereby putting the EU on a path to deepened transatlantic integration (Game of Thrones 
imagery). 
As for market-related matters, to every challenge there is also an opportunity and the Russian 
embargo on European agricultural products – as an externality of the EU sanctions policy –
could also qualify as such. The EU might want to consider seeking out for those opportunities, 
reorienting itself towards new markets which in the end could prove to be stable and certainly 
more reliable than that of Russia (mostly  in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa). There 
are also ongoing trade negotiations with Canada and the US) (EurActiv, 2014d). Turning 
‘negative’ into ‘positive’, the Russian embargo could be used as an ‘opportunity’ for opening 
up new doors to local products (European Commission, 2014c), while also positively 
contributing to the upheaval of the sanitary and phytosanitary levels in the countries with 
which the SPS barriers are currently blocking EU trade. The same holds true for the energy 
sector, where the tense EU-Russia relationship serves as a stimulus for EU countries to unite 
on energy policy and to seek to further reduce their dependency on Russian supplies.  
4. Threats 
The ‘winds of winter’ are coming and the EU remains in constant vigilance with one-third of its 
natural gas demand still being met by Russia, which can always decide to cut the supply off. 
Accordingly, even if the EU of today stands firm on its decision to maintain the restrictive 
measures towards Russia, Brussels might still need to reconsider its position at the next EU 
sanctions policy review purportedly to take place in the early 2015. The energy security threat 
is imminent and real, while alternative sources are still a future prospect. 
In the long run, the EU expects Iran – which holds the world’s second largest gas reserves after 
Russia – to serve the European Union as an alternative energy supplier (Interfax, 2014) 
(EurActiv, 2014e). However, at this time, Iran cannot be ‘of help’ to the EU as the country itself 
is in need of large pipeline infrastructure while also suffering from Western sanctions.  
According to a report by the EP’s DG of External Policies (European Parliament, DG External 
Policies, 2014), “Iran does not constitute a credible alternative energy supplier in the short 
term, but in a long-term perspective it is a promising country. The high potential for gas 
production, domestic energy sector reforms that are under way and ongoing normalisation of 
its relationship with the West make Iran a credible alternative to Russia”. 
 
12  TATIA DOLIDZE 
 
Figure 7. EU imports of Russian gas 
 
 
In view of that prognosis, the construction of Iran’s long-advocated Persian pipeline and the 
lifting of EU sanctions on Iran are likely to soon become a reality. Accordingly, on the one 
hand, "Iran's interest to deliver gas to Europe is very big. Parts of Iran's economic and political 
elite as well as Western companies are preparing for an end of the sanctions," as Frank 
Umbach, energy research director at King's College London stated (Reuters, 2014e). On the 
other hand, however, the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is not very excited about the idea 
of going ‘against’ Russia (Natural Gas Europe, 2014). Even more - Iran has recently (August 
2014) signed an “oil-for-goods/foods deal” worth of $20 billion with Russia (New York Times, 
2014). Taking everything into account, it seems like Tehran is double-dealing: cooperating both 
with Russia and the EU in favour of them as well as at their expense. Thus, if Iranian gas is a Plan 
B for European Union Energy Security, it is definitely not a secure plan, especially given that 
Iran’s production capabilities right now are not such as to expect EU gas supply resumption 
from Iran in case of its stoppage from Russia. The same is true for Norway – the second most 
important gas supplier for the EU after Russia. Norway’s Energy Minister Tord Lien reported 
to the EU the incapacity of the Norwegian energy system to deliver more this winter (World 
Bulletin, 2014).  
Yet, how likely is the Russian gas boycott of the EU energy market? Putin claims to have no 
such intentions, unless Ukraine, as a solution to the stoppage of gas supply by Russia in mid-
June 2014, begins to draw off the transit gas destined for Europe (Russia Today, 2014c). This 
assertion is quite credible considering the EU-Russia reciprocal economic supply-demand 
dependency (especially given the present Russian economic state of affairs), but mostly 
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because energy is the political lever in Russia’s hands that is much more efficient as a 
threatening instrument rather than post-factum.5 However, that does not leave Europe on the 
safe side, as one never knows with Putin. The unpredictable policy/decision-making is how 
Kremlin compensates for the state’s weaknesses. Besides, in ‘redeeming its honour’ Russia 
could go far beyond the sanctions war, with the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries being 
used as chess pieces in a larger EU-Russia Game of Thrones (recent examples: Russo-
Abkhazian pact on Alliance and Strategic Partnership (Dolidze, 2014) and the interruption of 
coal deliveries to Ukraine... (Oilprice.com, 2014)).  
What is more, Russia has already started developing an alternative money transfer system to 
SWIFT (Financial Tribune, 2014), which is expected to be launched in spring 2015 (Russia 
Today, 2014d). If successful (The Sovereign Inversor Daily, 2014), it would negatively affect 
the world financial system by dividing it into two separate schemes, making it less transparent 
and accountable and more vulnerable to terrorist attacks… Numerous countries would then 
opportunistically join the Russian venture of de-dollarisation. By the same token, the recent 
China-Russia gas deal, apart from being significant in that it opens up Russian energy supplies 
to China and by extension to Asia, also manifests the beginning of the death of the US 
petrodollar (GlobalResearch, 2015). The payments will be made in domestic currencies 
(Huffington Post, 2014), which is meant to strengthen the ruble and the yuan while dethroning 
the dollar as the world reserve currency. Against this background, “it’s a fact that the Russians 
can turn the US economy upside down”, as world-renown gold expert Jim Sinclair instructs 
(Global Economic Warfare, 2014). That is when the EU ought to avoid being dragged down 
with US all along. With the forthcoming “winds of winter”, the EU might need to remind itself 
that it is purchasing gas from Russia in dollars. Thus, in case there are no more dollars in use 
for deals with Russia, the EU would have to pay Russia in its national currency against the US 
interests, plausibly complicating the EU-US relations.  
5. Concluding remarks 
On the whole, as shown in the matrix in Figure 8 below, the SWOT analysis revealed that apart 
from the unambiguous ‘weaknesses’, there are many weaknesses also in the ‘strengths’ and 
‘opportunities’ of the EU’s sanctions policy towards Russia. At the same time, the threats are 
also there, without the EU having actual remedies to counter them. 
                                                   
5 For an up-to-date analysis, see Owen Matthews, “Putin’s ‘Last and Best Weapon’ Against Europe: 
Gas”, Newsweek, 24 September 2014 (www.newsweek.com/2014/10/03/putins-last-and-best-weapon-
against-europe-gas-272652.html). 
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Figure 8. SWOT analysis of EU sanctions policy towards Russia 
 
The EU’s sanctions policy towards Russia is still in need of restructuring despite its wide-
ranging nature identified as a ‘strength’. That is because the policy is left on its own without a 
far-reaching strategic direction while sanctions policy should be applied in support of the 
broader strategy rather than being the strategy per se. Therefore, it is important for the EU 
to find a balance between hard- and soft-power tools, which so far has been a ‘weak link’ 
in the EU policy towards Russia. When diplomatic dealings with the government do not 
work, society-targeted soft-power tools, if applied alongside the hard power, could reinforce 
the desired political effects of economic sanctions. Russia’s citizens as targets in this context 
are especially significant as the Kremlin-targeted restrictive measures affected their pockets as 
well. That is when it is also imperative for the EU to be scrupulous in communicating 
unpopular decisions to the Russian audience (see ‘Weaknesses’). Having a fully-fledged 
strategy would also allow the coordination with the US without concerns over political 
‘bullying’ (Financial Times, 2014b) from their side. That could also be identified as an 
opportunity for the EU to work together with the US in a more self-regulating manner. Still, 
other opportunities identified in the course of the analysis are more responsive than naturally 
so. That is, they arise from the EU’s capacity to bypass the precincts set by Russia in the 
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agricultural market or energy sector while not presenting ways for the EU to realise its original 
political goal of altering the Kremlin’s behaviour.  
It thus seems that the EU is in an inferior position when playing ‘chess’ with Russia. As a 
consequence, the EU may well have to concentrate on its ‘defending/protecting pieces’ 
(energy supply diversification, market reorientation, building up an EU CFSP, etc.) rather than 
‘attacking/threatening’ ones (SWIFT, WTO, prolonged sanctions, etc.) that can result in 
complications for the EU itself (see “Strengths”). Otherwise, with the forthcoming ‘winds of 
winter’, the EU might also try to avoid any Russian ‘attack move’ (energy, further destabilising 
EU’s eastern neighbourhood, etc.) by removing the ‘check’ (sanctions).  
All things considered, the sanctionee-sanctioner’s Game of Thrones seems to be a zero-sum 
game of chess between Russia and the EU. Russia is ‘in check’ through the EU sanctions but 
still capable of ‘checkmating’ the EU in view of its energy leverage. The EU is put more in a 
‘stalemate’ than ‘in check’ by Russian countersanctions. There is still a chance for the EU to 
legally retaliate against Russia in case the WTO procedure runs its course, puts Russia at fault 
and compensation to the EU is not forthcoming… Yet if this multilateral framework does not 
deliver in terms of inducing Russia to alter its ‘moves’, then the only option left for the EU 
would be to draw the game to avoid losing. In this case, the EU will already have made its last 
‘legal move’ by only filing a complaint against Russia in the WTO. All the more as “the Russian 
view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battle-space is the mind” as recently 
suggested in a remarkable study by National Defense Academy of Latvia.6. In other words, 
threats coming from Russia, apart from being unpredictable (see ‘Threats’), are not even that 
straightforward anymore. If an ‘index of retaliation’ existed, Russia would probably rank at 
the highest level: Russia is a nuclear power and, stagnating or not, its economy is still the 8th 
largest in the world (Rabobank, 2014). In other words, Russia’s retaliatory options are 
theoretically unlimited or limited to a highly unpredictable extent and manner.  
  
                                                   
6 For an informed inquiry into Russia’s present-day warfare style, see Jānis Bērziņš, “Russia’s New 
Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy”, National Defence Academy 
of Latvia, Center for Security and Strategic Research, April 2014 (www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/ 
AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx).  
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Annex  
Table A1. What do you think better explains the Western reaction to the events in Crimea and the East 
of Ukraine? 
Hostile attitude towards Russia, the desire to seize the moment to put 
pressure on Russia 
58 
As the condemnation of annexation of foreign territory, in violation of 
international law 
13 
Lack of understanding of the real situation in Ukraine 18 
Difficult to answer 10 
 
Translation: Tatia Dolidze (author).  
Source: Levada Center, Moscow (http://www.levada.ru/02-09-2014/prisoedinenie-kryma-k-rossii).  
 
 
Table A2. What do you think is the objective of Western sanctions against Russia? 
To weaken and humiliate Russia 71 
To re-establish the geopolitical balance of power 18 
To stop the war, destruction and death of people in the East of Ukraine 4 
Difficult to answer 8 
 
Translation: Tatia Dolidze (author). 
Source: Levada Center, Moscow (http://www.levada.ru/30-09-2014/sanktsii-i-kontrsanktsii).  
 
 
Table A3. Against whom do you think are the current western sanctions directed? 
 May.14 Jun.14 Sep.14 
Against the wider part of the Russian population 27 31 41 
Only against the narrow circle of people responsible for 
the Russian policy towards Ukraine 
42 35 30 
The leadership of the West does not reflect on the 
extent to which their sanctions affect the wider 
population of Russia 
19 22 21 
Difficult to answer 13 12 8 
 
Translation: Tatia Dolidze (author). 
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